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1 The EU project CARMEN (2008) is design
chitecture capable of supporting carrier-grade re
dio technologies.Radio links are used to provide backhaul connectivity for base stations of mobile networks, in cases in
which cable based alternatives are not available and cannot be deployed in an economic or timely
manner. While such wireless backhauls have been predominantly used in redundant tree and ring
topologies in the past, mobile network operators have become increasingly interested in meshed
topologies for carrier grade wireless backhauls. However, wireless mesh backhauls are potentially more
susceptible to security vulnerabilities, given that radio links are more exposed to tampering and given
their higher system complexity.
This article extends prior security threat analyses of 3rd generation mobile network architectures
for the case of wireless mesh backhauls. It presents a description of the security model for the
considered architecture and provides a list of the basic assumptions, security objectives, assets to be
protected and actors of the analysis. On this foundation, potential security threats are analyzed and
discussed and then assessed for their corresponding risk. The result of this risk assessment is then used
to define a set of security requirements. Finally, we give some recommendations for wireless mesh
backhaul designs and implementations following these requirements.
.solutions security therefore becomes a high priority non funcRadio links are used to provide backhaul connectivity for base
stations of mobile networks, in cases in which cable based
alternatives are not available and cannot be deployed in an
economic or timely manner. To ensure high availability, such
wireless backhauls have been predominantly used in redundant
tree and ring topologies. Yet, following the success of WiFi based
wireless mesh networks in recent years, mobile network
operators have become increasingly interested in meshed
topologies for carrier grade wireless backhauls as well.1 Mesh
topologies may provide availability levels comparable to
redundant trees and rings, while being more flexible and using
capacity more efficiently.
However, radio links are also more exposed, and thus easier to
tap and to interfere with, than their wired counterparts. This
makes wireless backhauls, and in particular multi hop ones like in
wireless meshes, potentially more susceptible to security
vulnerabilities. For carrier grade wireless mesh backhaul
 Corresponding author. Tel.: +4962214342142.
E-mail addresses: Frank.Zdarsky@neclab.eu (F.A. Zdarsky),banchs@it.uc3m.es (A. Banchs).
ing a wireless mesh network
quirements over a diverse set of
1tional requirement.
Mobile network operators have high security demands in order
to protect their business assets. Assets not only include the mobile
network infrastructure and services, which must be protected
from unauthorized use and from attacks on their availability
or quality, but an important asset requiring protection is
furthermore an operator’s reputation with current and potential
customers. They thus need to ensure that their customers’ data
that is transported via their networks is protected against
misappropriation. In some legislation, this is even an obligation
of carriers as part of their due diligence.
Architectural design issues can quickly compromise these
security goals. A prominent example is GSM’s security architecture
that only requires user authentication towards the network. In
contrast, the network itself is not authenticated to its users. This
design flaw has subsequently been exploited to mount ‘‘false base
station attacks’’: An attacker uses a device popularly called
‘‘IMSI catcher’’, which pretends to be a legal base station with a
superior signal quality. This causes mobile phones in the vicinity to
associate themselves with the false base station, which then signals
the mobile phones to switch off encryption, as investigated by
Adoba et al. (2004). Similar attacks have been reported for Universal
Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) networks by exploiting
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) backward
compatibility, as stated in Adoba et al. (2008).
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reader is referred e.g. to (iGillott Research, 2007) for a study of
security in 3G networks including some statistics on attacks in the
past), the multihop nature of Wireless Mesh Backhauls (WMBs)
exposes the network to new security threats which require
additional measures to counteract. This article therefore extends
the security threat analysis of 3G network architectures by 3GPP
(2001) for the case of WMBs.
The following section provides an overview of related work.
Section 3 starts with a description of the security model for the
considered architecture. It then provides a list of the basic
assumptions made for the subsequent security analysis and
introduces the security objectives, the assets to be protected
and the actors of this analysis. On this foundation, potential
security threats are analyzed and discussed in Section 4. They are
classified both by the security objective under attack and the
point of attack. Not all identified security threats are equally
likely, as they require various levels of sophistication of an
attacker. Also, the impact of a successful attack on the mobile
network operator can vary. Thus, Section 5 performs a risk
assessment of the identified security threats. The result of this risk
assessment is then used to define a set of security requirements
for wireless mesh backhauls. These requirements are outlined in
Section 5.5. Section 6 then provides a list of general recommenda
tions to meet these requirements for the design of wireless mesh
backhaul architectures and protocols. Finally, Section 7 provides a
short summary of the findings in this analysis.2. Related work
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thOver the last years, a number of security architectures and
mechanisms have been devised for Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMNs).
Some of these works address user authentication in WMNs. For
example, Zhang and Fang (2006) propose ARSA, a security
architecture that allows users to access and roam between a
multitude of WMNs belonging to different administrative do
mains based on a ‘‘pass’’ of a third party provider. This is
supposed to resolve the problem of establishing pair wise trust
relationships between the operators of the different WMNs. They
also address the problem of user location privacy by providing the
user with different alias identities. Similarly, Ren et al. (2010)
describe PEACE, a security solution with authentication and key
agreement protocols that provide protection against attacks on
user privacy while providing a strict user access control.
Other papers address Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in WMNs.
For example, Yan et al. (2009) study DoS attacks in which
attackers generate a flood of high rate data flows to deny service
to other, legitimate traffic. They use a frequency analysis of
incoming packets to detect such attacks and study different
strategies of countering these attacks through selective random
dropping.
Yet other papers address attacks on the control plane protocols
of WMNs. For example, Naveed and Kanhere (2006) study attacks
on dynamic channel assignment in 802.11 based WMNs, in which
a compromised mesh node manipulates control messages of the
channel assignment protocol to force mesh links to use heavily
congested channels. Similarly, a number of attacks on routing
protocols in WMNs and ad hoc networks exist (see Hu and Perrig,
2004 for a survey of such attacks).
All of these works aim at addressing some security threats that
according to the authors’ intuition is relevant for WMNs.
However, none of them contains a systematic approach to
determine which security threats are really relevant and should
require more efforts to prevent them. This question is particularly
2levant if a wireless mesh network is used as backhaul for a
obile cellular network. In this case, many security features are
ready provided by the mobile network, for example the
thentication framework with pair wise trust relationships
tween operators, the handling of temporal identities and the
licing of user data flows. Furthermore, all network entities are
der a single administrative control, which facilitates protection
the control and data planes. In contrast to all these previous
orks, in this paper we conduct a complete analysis of security
reats with focus on WMBs for mobile networks.As stated in the introduction, before describing the potential
curity threats of a WMB a detailed system description
necessary to provide a reasonable understanding of the
nsidered network architecture. Hence, this section presents
e system model, the assumptions, the security objectives,
e assets and the actors considered in the following threat
alysis.
1. System description
Prior to going into the detailed analysis of the potential
curity issues, it is necessary to clearly delimit the system under
st. When doing so, it is important to consider that a wireless
esh backhaul is supposed to provide a drop in replacement for
rts of the operator’s wired backhaul. As such, it represents only
small sub system within a complete mobile network architec
re, e.g. a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) architecture.
is valid to assume that this architecture provides its own
curity features, designed based on a separate security analysis.
case of 3GPP, the security analysis is documented in 3GPP
001).
Fig. 1 shows the system security model of a traditional wireless
cess network with wired backhaul. It focuses on the transport
ratum, i.e. all protocols required for the provisioning of a data
ansport between a user terminal (UT) and the core network. It
rther distinguishes between the management and control plane
d the data plane of this stratum. The former divides into the
er signaling part between the UT and its Point of Attachment
oA) to the network, which in a mobile network is a wireless link,
d the core network signaling part between the network
ements of the access network and the core network, which is
pically wired, but may use non meshed wireless links
r backhaul. The data plane transports data between the UT
d the core network. This data traffic is typically end to end2
crypted. Note that the data plane from the point of view of the
ansport stratum may also carry management and control
essages of the next higher stratum, i.e. the serving/home
twork stratum.
User signaling, core network signaling and user data form
ree ‘‘security domains’’, in the sense that if an attacker succeeds
overcoming the security features of one domain, all sub
stems within this domain are compromised, but not necessarily
ose of other domains. The latter depends on how well domains
e ‘‘firewalled’’ from each other. Fig. 2 shows the security
mains of an access network using a WMB for backhaul. The
ure also shows the security domains of the traditional access as
ayed out arrows, which are not covered in the present analysis,
it is assumed that proper security features to protect them are
2 End-to-end in the sense of all the way between UT and the core network, so
e content of data is not visible to the access network.
in place. Instead, the analysis will focus on these three sub
systems:
 Likewise, UTs are not used for relaying of traffic.
 All network entities are static, so it can be assumed that their
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Fig. 1. Security model in traditional wireless access networks.
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Fig. 2. System security model of a mobile network operator’s meshed access network.
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 the load controlled data flows as well as. the network entities of a WMB architecture3.2. Assumptions 
To further delimit the scope of this analysis, the following
assumptions are made that are in part a consequence of assuming
a carrier grade context:
 All network entities of the mesh network are owned and
operated by a single administrative entity the mobile net
work operator. Mesh nodes (MNs) never deliberately use other
MNs under different administration to relay their packets.3
3 For a security architecture that addresses WiFi mesh networks in which
nodes belong to different operators see, for example, Toubiana et al. (in press).3neighborhood only changes when a network entity of the
WMB is activated or deactivated. The physical network entities are tamper proof, i.e. there are
physical countermeasures in place that prevent an attacker
with physical access to the device to access information stored
in the device. This means, for example, that when a device is
opened, it loses all its stored state and cannot be reactivated.
On the other hand, physical destruction of a network entity or
one of its components, e.g. its antennas, is a realistic scenario
and has to be taken into account. Likewise, it is futile to try to protect wireless links against
physical attacks such as jamming, same as against natural
impairments like fog and rain. Thus, it is assumed that the
considered WMB architecture is able to tolerate the failure of
single wireless links and ensure that this only has a transient
effect on the service in the remaining part of the network.
Users have full control of the terminal, which means one
cannot expect that the operating system or the firmware of the
terminal are a sufficient protection against manipulation of
signaling traffic.
an
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entities may be faulty.
3.3. Security objectives
A secure WMB architecture should ensure the following
security properties:
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the absence of disclosure of
information to unauthorized individuals or systems. Examples of
violations of this property are eavesdropping on confidential
communication or inference of confidential information through
passive or active traffic analysis.
Integrity: Integrity is the absence of alteration of information
by unauthorized individuals or systems. An example of a violation
of this property is the manipulation of communication or of data
stored inside a network entity.
Authenticity: Authenticity is the establishment that informa
tion is genuine and has not been forged or fabricated. An example
of a violation of this property is the masquerading of an attacker
as a legitimate user of the system to obtain access to confidential
information.
Non repudiation: Non repudiation means preventing that an
individual or system can deny having participated in a transaction
with another individual or system. An example of a violation of
this property would be that a user denies having established a call
to avoid being charged for it. Establishing this property requires,
among other things, the existence of charging and accounting
mechanisms, which are outside the scope of this work.
Availability: Availability is the delivery of predictable and
timely service. The most prominent example of a violation of
availability is a DoS attack, typically a resource exhaustion attack.
Privacy: Privacy means the protection of user data from
disclosure to unauthorized individuals or systems. This pertains,
for example, to information about the user’s identity or location. It
also pertains to user data traffic, but protection of the latter is
typically subsumed under ‘‘confidentiality’’ and this analysis
handles it this way, too. An example of a violation of this property
is the ability to track a user’s location via the network.
3.4. Assets
WMBs store and transport different types of information, such
as network state and user data, and require different types of
resources for their operation. A security solution therefore needs
to protect a wide range of assets:
 User related assets: user data, (temporary or permanent) user
identity, user location.W
de
stSecurity related assets: security credentials, session keys.
Mesh management and control assets: measurement probes
for network monitoring, signaling for radio resource manage3.ment, routing etc.ab4.Mesh network assets: memory, computing and energy re
sources of network entities, wireless link bandwidth.at
w
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Trusted actors in the sense of this analysis are the users and the
operator of the WMB. A user is a person that has an association,
for example a pre paid or post paid contract with the operator
that allows users to use the access services of the mesh. The
operator in turn is a person or organization that provides access
services to users based on an existing association between them.
4There are two kinds of threat agents in the sense of this
alysis: The first is faulty software installed on the UTs of a
n malicious user that displays Byzantine faults. This means the
T may, for example, produce invalid protocol messages or not
llow the protocol correctly, but does not deliberately try to
oduce messages that exploit a security vulnerability. The
cond one is the classical attacker. Attackers may have different
vels of sophistication (3GPP, 2005):individuals capable of performing passive or active attacks on
dio interfaces using off the shelf equipment of limited
rformance.
ganized crime or ‘‘cyber terrorists’’ are resourceful organiza
ns, powerful enough to put up false MNs, having a largetio
computing power, etc.
agency is an extremely resourceful organization, e.g. a
tional agency. This type of attacker is not considered furtherna
in this analysis, because it is assumed that agencies have more
effective means to access or manipulate user related data,
including legal interception.
The two former types of attacker can be further differentiated
to whether they are inside attackers, meaning they are
thorized to use a service, but abuse it in order to mount an
tack, or whether they are outside attackers that do not have or
quire a minimum level of authorization for their attack. Finally,
is distinguished between a passive attacker, which is an outside
tacker that just eavesdrops on communication, and an active
tacker that tries to impersonate users or network entities and
nds signals or information to mount an attack.
Identification of potential security threatsThis section analyses the system under test with respect to the
tential security threats it may be subject to. As argued in
ction 3.1, one can assume that the wireless mesh backbone is
bedded into a full mobile network architecture that provides
own security features. The following analysis therefore does
t cover security threats targeted at the wireless access link
ata and signaling), the core network (data and signaling) or the
d to end user data protection.4 Instead it focuses on
e wireless mesh specific part, namely the signaling for manage
ent and control as well as the data transport inside the WMB.
1. Threats to wireless mesh management and control
Since this work took the common approach to distinguish the
MB architecture between data and management planes, the
scription of the investigated threats will follow the same
ructure. Furthermore, the written security objectives in Section
3 will be taken as a classification for the treats. All treats will be
breviated with the capital letter T.
1.1. Threats to confidentiality
T1 Eavesdropping mesh management or control frames: An
tacker may eavesdrop management or control frames on the
ireless links between MNs. The knowledge gained from this
uld be useful to mount a subsequent active attack on the
stem, e.g. a deletion attack on a specific protocol message.
4 For an analysis of these threats, the reader is referred to the 3GPP
chitecture’s security analysis document in 3GPP (2001). The present analysis
o follows that document’s structure.
F.A. Zdarsky et al. / Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34 (2011) 432–442436T2 Masquerading as an MN : An attacker may masquerade as an
MN to intercept mesh management and control frames from
neighboring MNs. This enables many different forms of active
attacks, in particular attacks on routing (e.g. black hole routing
attacks).
T3 Passive traffic analysis: An attacker may observe the traffic
patterns of mesh management and control frames (e.g. frame
lengths, rates, and sequences) sent between MNs to infer
information about the employed management and control
policies, the system state, etc. This information can be used to
discover a suitable attack vector.
T4 Active traffic analysis: An attacker may send signals or
protocol frames with valid or invalid protocol fields to an MN and
observe the behavior of the MN and the remaining system, e.g. the
types and lengths of responses and the latencies after which
responses are sent. This can be used to fingerprint the system and
its sub systems, which is useful to discover a suitable attack
vector.4.1.2. Threats to IntegrityT5 Manipulation of mesh management or control frames: An
attacker may insert, delete, modify or replay management or
control frames on the wireless links between MNs.4.1.3. Threats to AuthenticityT6 Masquerading as another network entity: An attacker may
masquerade as a legitimate MN of the mesh network towards a
booting MN that wishes to associate with the network and then
hijack his connection after authentication has been performed.4.1.4. Threats to Availability
T6 Physical intervention: An attacker may use physical means,
5such as jamming, to prevent management and control frames
from being sent between MNs. Also, the attacker could delay
transmissions by deleting protocol messages as well as their
retransmissions and re inserting them at any later point in time.
Another attack vector could be to create continuous or modulated
interference on selected radio links to degrade their link quality
and cause network internal management functions to adjust the
network topology or traffic flows. This could lead to instability in
the mesh network due to topology and route flapping.
T8 Protocol intervention: An attacker may introduce forged
protocol messages, e.g. in a routing protocol to announce false or
suboptimal routes to cause route flapping or traffic deletion (black
hole routing).
T9 Resource exhaustion by outside attacker: An outside attacker
may flood Access Points (APs) with authentication/association
requests that, while denied, cause authentication and authoriza
tion signaling traffic between the AP and its Gateway (GW). This
traffic may degrade the system’s performance or the service
quality of legitimate traffic.
T10 Resource exhaustion by inside attacker: An inside attacker
may flood APs or GWs with session requests and release requests
that cause admission control and management signaling traffic
between the AP and the GW. Likewise, the attacker could provoke
high rates of paging messages to be sent by the network. This
traffic may degrade the system’s performance or the service
quality of legitimate traffic.
T11 Resource exhaustion by Byzantine failure: Faulty software on
a UT may send invalid or a high rate of valid requests to the
system, causing a degradation of the system’s performance or the
service quality of legitimate traffic.4.1.5. Threats to user privacy
T12 Traffic analysis: An attacker may perform an active or
passive analysis of the management and control messages’ time,
rate, length, source, and destination to track a user’s location.
4.2. Threats on wireless mesh data transport
4.2.1. Threats to confidentiality
T13 Eavesdropping user data frames: An attacker may eavesdrop
user data frames on the wireless links between MNs. Even if end
to end encryption is employed, an eavesdropper may still
possibly infer the source, destination and route of user data
frames, which could be useful to mount a subsequent active
attack on the system, e.g. a deletion attack.
T14 Masquerading as an MN : An attacker may masquerade as
an MN to intercept user data frames from neighboring MNs. For
instance, this could be used to cause retransmissions and thus
higher traffic loads inside the mesh network.
T15 Passive traffic analysis: An attacker may observe the traffic
patterns of user data frames (e.g. frame lengths, rates, and
sequences) sent between MNs to infer information about the
network utilization, load distribution and traffic mix, which could
be useful for business intelligence purposes. Furthermore, it could
be used to track a user’s location.
T16 Active traffic analysis: An attacker may send data frames for
authorized or non authorized users to an MN and observe the
behavior of the MN and the remaining system, e.g. the types and
lengths of responses and the latencies after which responses are
sent. This can be used to fingerprint the system and its
sub systems, which is useful to discover a suitable attack vector.
4.2.2. Threats to integrity
T17 Manipulation of user data frames: An attacker may insert,
delete, modify or replay user data frames transported on wireless
links between MNs. Even if end to end integrity checking is
performed by the user or the core network, a manipulation may
still cause retransmissions and thus higher traffic loads inside the
mesh network.
4.2.3. Threats to authenticity
This threat is equal to threat T6 written in Section 4.1.3.
4.2.4. Threats to availability
T18 Physical intervention: An attacker may use physical means,
such as jamming, to prevent user data frames from being sent
between MNs. Also, the attacker could delay transmissions by
deleting user data frames as well as their retransmissions. Forcing
of retransmissions could be used to increase the load and thus
decrease the service quality in the mesh network.
T19 Resource exhaustion by inside attacker: An inside attacker
may send data traffic such that it maximizes its impact on the
service quality of legitimate user data traffic, e.g. using results
from adversarial queuing theory, as described by Borodin et al.
(1996).
4.2.5. Threats to user privacy
T20 Traffic analysis: An attacker may perform an active or
passive analysis of the user data traffic’s time, rate, length, source,
and destination to track a user’s location.
4.3. Threats on wireless mesh network entities
4.3.1. Threats to confidentiality
T21 Unauthorized access to data stored by or forwarded through
network entities: An attacker may obtain access to information
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Threat impact levels used for risk assessment.
Level Impact Example
1 Minimal Threats that would not imply anything for user privacy,
Quality of Service (QoS) or charging, e.g. being able to
occasionally increase a phone’s transmit power.
2 Small Threats that, if realized, only cause very small annoyance for
a single user during a short period of time.
3 Medium Local threats, e.g., DoS attack targeted at a small set of nearby
MNs. Could occasionally lead to single instances of incorrect
charging data.
4 High Something that, if realized, would be mentioned in
IT/telecom media.
5 Very
high
Something that would make front-page news, seriously
damaging the trust in mobile networks, either from users’ or
operators’ point of view, e.g. complete loss of privacy and/or
robust charging.
Table 2
Threat likelihood levels used for risk assessment.
Level Likelihood Example
1 Negligible Attack successful with a probability comparable to
guessing/breaking an (at least) 80-bit key, or requiring
resources equivalent to breaking such a key. Alternatively,
requiring full control of some critical function, e.g. the
Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA)
F.A. Zdarsky et al. / Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34 (2011) 432–442 437stored by network entities. Access to network entities may be
obtained either locally or remotely, and may involve breaching
physical or logical controls.
T22 Fingerprinting: An attacker may perform a passive or active
traffic analysis to fingerprint a network entity’s protocol stack,
operating systems or services. This information can be used to
discover a suitable active attack vector.
4.3.2. Threats to integrity
T23 Manipulation of data stored by network entities: An attacker
may insert, delete or modify data stored by network entities.
Access to network entities may be obtained either locally or
remotely, and may involve breaching physical or logical controls.
4.3.3. Threats to authenticity
T24 Masquerading as network entity: An attacker may masquer
ade as a valid network entity to steal the credentials of a network
management entity or to hijack his connection after authentica
tion has been performed.
4.3.4. Threats to availability
T25 Physical intervention: An attacker may physically destroy
or manipulate a network entity or one of its parts (e.g. a single
antenna). Furthermore, he could deliberately interrupt the net
work entities power supply to deactivate it or to force it to restart.
T26 Resource exhaustion by an outside attacker: An outside
attacker may abuse faults in the protocol stack to reduce or even
exhaust a network entity’s memory, processing or energy
(if battery powered) resources. This could degrade the system’s
availability to legitimate users.
T27 Resource exhaustion by an inside attacker: An inside
attacker may abuse faults in the protocol stack or send a flood
of service requests to reduce or even exhaust a network entity’s
memory, processing or energy (if battery powered) resources.
This could degrade the system’s availability to legitimate users.
T28 Resource exhaustion by Byzantine failure: Faulty software on
a UT may send invalid or a high rate of valid requests to a network
entity that reduce or even exhaust its memory, processing or
energy (if battery powered) resources. This could degrade the
system’s availability to legitimate users.
4.3.5. Threats to user privacy
T29 Browsing of user related data stored by network entities: An
attacker may obtain access to information stored or cached in
network entities that allows him to infer private information
about a user, e.g., to connect the user’s identity with a temporary
terminal identifier to track user movement or service usage
profiles.
5. Risk assessment of security threatsinfrastructure, from the ‘‘outside’’.
2 Unlikely Organized crime with considerable resources would only
occasionally be able to mount a successful attack.
3 Medium Organizations capable of erecting rogue WMB equipment,
e.g. MNs, are likely to be able to succeed.
4 High Qualified/resourceful individuals or small groups, e.g.
capable of manipulating consumer products on a limited
scale, could succeed.
5 Almost
certain
The attack is performed realized by single, averagely
skilled ‘‘hackers’’ with standard PC/phone resources,
possibly using ‘‘attacking tools’’ developed by someone
else, found on the Internet.
Adapted from 3GPP (2005).After defining all investigated security threats in the previous
section all threats will be assessed regarding their risks to the
security of the WMB. The main goal of the risk assessment activity
is to evaluate the identified potential threats and assign risks
to them. They thus become comparable with each other.
Furthermore, this allows major risks to be identified.
For the risk assessment, we adopt the methodology defined by
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)’s
Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG), as described in ETSI
TC STAG (1996):
 Following this methodology, each threat is first evaluated with
respect to the impact I it would have on each threatened
6bject if it occurred. The impact is appraised on a scale from
e to five, with one being the lowest impact.
ext, the likelihood of occurrence O is evaluated, again on ascale from one to five with one being the lowest likelihood.
ultiplying the level of impact with the level of likelihoodyields the so called exposure factor, i.e. the product of I and O.
nally, threats are ranked by their exposure factor and majorrisks those having an exposure factor above a certain
reshold (here: 10) are identified. The result is summarized
Table 3.
e five levels of impact and likelihood need to be madeplication domain. Here, we adopt the levels for a 3GPP environ
ent, as described in 3GPP (2005). The employed levels for threaterational by defining them within the context of a specific
pact and threat likelihood are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The following list presents the risk assessment for each
entified potential threat. Where applicable, it also contains
rward references (-RxÞ to the list of security requirements in
ction 5.5. Note that in particular the appraisal of the likelihood
occurrence is time variant and depends on border conditions
e the computational power available to a ‘‘resourceful
ganisation’’ or the skills and automated tools available to a
ble 1
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7‘‘pass by’’ cracker. This risk assessment therefore requires
re evaluation if border conditions change in the future.
5.1. Threats to wireless mesh management and control
5.1.1. Threats to confidentiality
T1 Eavesdropping mesh management or control frames:
Assuming a proper and robust encryption of management and
control frames -R1Þ, the likelihood of occurrence is negligible,
but a successful attack would make headlines in IT/telecommedia
if realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 4 (high)
T2 Masquerading as a MN : Assuming proper mutual authenti
cation of MNs ð-R2Þ, the likelihood of successfully masquerading
as a MN, e.g. to intercept management and control frames, is
negligible. However, a successful attack would make headlines in
IT/telecom media if realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 4 (high)
T3 Passive traffic analysis: A passive traffic analysis to find
vulnerabilities of the WMB requires individuals or groups with
the resources and the skills to sniff and analyze mesh traffic. The
impact of this analysis is minimal, as long as this attack is not
used to prepare an active attack.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 1 (minimal)
T4 Active traffic analysis: An active traffic analysis to find
vulnerabilities of the WMB requires individuals or groups with
the resources and the skills to sniff and analyze mesh traffic. The
impact of this analysis is small due to occasional impairment of
network service, as long as this attack is not used to prepare an
active attack.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 2 (small)
5.1.2. Threats to integrity
T5 Manipulation of mesh management or control frames:
Assuming a proper and robust mutual authentication of MNs
-R1Þ and checking for integrity and validity of mesh
management and control frames ð-R3Þ, the likelihood of
occurrence is negligible, but a successful attack could affect the
service availability of the whole network and make front page
headlines if realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 5 (very high)
5.1.3. Threats to authenticity
T6 Masquerading as another network entity: Assuming a proper
and robust encryption of management and control frames ð-R1Þ,
the likelihood of occurrence is negligible, but a successful attack
could affect the service availability of the whole network and
would make front page headlines if realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 5 (very high)
5.1.4. Threats to availability
T7 Physical intervention: An intelligent jamming that can cause
network wide instabilities requires a higher level of sophistica
tion than merely taking down a single mesh link through
jamming, because the characteristics and behavior of the targeted
mechanism have to be taken into account. Resource requirements
are moderate, though, and a successful attack could affect the
service availability of the whole network and is very likely to
receive coverage in at least in the IT/telecoms media.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 4 (high)
T8 Protocol intervention: Assuming a proper and robust
authentication ð-R1Þ and checking for integrity and validity
ð-R3Þ, the likelihood that an attacker manages to inject malicious
protocol messages is negligible, but a successful attack couldaffect the service availability of the whole network and would
make front page headlines if realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 5 (very high)
T9 Resource exhaustion by outside attacker: An authentication/
association flooding attack is relatively easy to perform as the
necessary tools are simple to create or obtain. Also the risk of
exposure of the attacker is comparatively low. Assuming
measures to rate control the acceptance of user signaling as well
as proper performance dimensioning and implementation of the
AP ð-R6Þ, the impact of this attack should be small.
Likelihood: 5 (almost certain), Impact: 2 (small)
T10 Resource exhaustion by inside attacker: While, for example,
the tools for an attack by flooding of call setup/release requests
are simple to create or obtain, the necessity for authorized
network access by multiple attackers requires quite some
resources and has a high risk of exposure. Assuming measures
to rate control the acceptance of user signaling as well as proper
performance dimensioning and implementation of the AP ð-R6Þ,
the impact of this attack should be small, though.
Likelihood: 3 (medium), Impact: 2 (small)
T11 Resource exhaustion by Byzantine failure: While software
faults causing byzantine behavior are likely to exist in user
terminals, it is unlikely that these cause floods of valid or invalid
requests. Assuming measures to rate control the acceptance of
user signaling as well as proper performance dimensioning and
implementation of the AP ð-R6Þ, the impact of this attack should
be small, though.
Likelihood: 2 (unlikely), Impact: 2 (small)
5.1.5. Threats to user privacy
T12 Traffic analysis: A traffic analysis of management and
control traffic, for example to track user locations, requires
individuals or groups with significant resources and the skills to
sniff and analyze mesh traffic on a relatively large number of
wireless mesh links. The effort for this attack also seems hardly
worth the effort, as simpler methods exist to track user locations.
Also, the impact of this attack would be relatively small, as users
are typically little concerned with location privacy and expect
public authorities to be able to obtain this information from the
operators anyway.
Likelihood: 2 (unlikely), Impact: 2 (small)
5.2. Threats on wireless mesh data transport
5.2.1. Threats to confidentiality
T13 Eavesdropping user data frames: Assuming proper and
robust encryption of user data ð-R4Þ, the likelihood of occurrence
is negligible, but a successful attack would make front page
headlines.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 5 (very high)
T14 Masquerading as a MN : Assuming proper mutual
authentication of MNs ð-R2Þ the likelihood of successfully
masquerading as a MN to intercept user data frames is negligible.
However, a successful attack would make front page headlines if
realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 5 (very high)
T15 Passive traffic analysis: A passive traffic analysis, for
example to track user locations or obtain business intelligence,
requires individuals or groups with significant resources and the
skills to sniff and analyze mesh traffic on a relatively large number
of wireless mesh links. The effort for this attack also seems hardly
worth the effort, as simpler methods exist to obtain this
information. Still, this knowledge might be somewhat interesting
to an operator’s competitor.
Likelihood: 2 (unlikely), Impact: 3 (medium)
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vulnerabilities of the WMB requires individuals or groups with
the resources and the skills to sniff and analyses mesh traffic. This
impact of the analysis is small due to occasional local impairment
of network service, as long as this attack is not used to prepare an
active attack.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 2 (small)5.2.2. Threats to integrity
re
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atT17 Manipulation of user data frames: Assuming a proper and
robust mutual authentication of MNs ð-R1Þ and checking for
integrity of transported user data frames ð-R5Þ, the likelihood of
occurrence is negligible, but a successful attack would make
front page headlines if realized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 5 (very high)5.2.3. Threats to availability lik
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service requires a higher level of sophistication than merely
taking down a single mesh link through jamming, but is feasible
by a resourceful, qualified attacker. The attack would be of small
impact, though, as it would merely lead to a local degradation of
user service.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 2 (small)
T19 Resource exhaustion by inside attacker: Assuming a proper
policing of user data at the ingress point ð-R7Þ, an attack in
which an insider causes a resource exhaustion by flooding with
user data requires considerably high amounts of expertise and
resources. It might then potentially have an impact on the user
service in the whole network.
Likelihood: 2 (unlikely), Impact: 3 (medium)
5.2.4. Threats to use privacyT20 Traffic analysis: A traffic analysis of user data traffic to
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resources and the skills to sniff and analyze mesh traffic on a
relatively large number of wireless mesh links. The effort for this
attack also seems hardly worth the effort, as simpler methods
exist to track user locations. Also, the impact of this attack would
be relatively small, as users are typically little concerned with
location privacy and expect public authorities to be able to obtain
this information from the operators anyway.
Likelihood: 2 (unlikely), Impact: 2 (small)
5.3. Threats on wireless mesh network entitieslik
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T21 Unauthorized access to data stored by or forwarded through
network entities: Assuming proper mutual authentication of MNs
ð-R2Þ the attacker would have to find a vulnerability in the
implementation of the network stack or the limited services
running on the network entities, which requires a relatively high
level of expertise. A successful attack with read access to the very
limited information on network entities is likely to receive
coverage in IT/telecoms media if realized.
Likelihood: 3 (medium), Impact: 4 (high)
T22 Fingerprinting: Fingerprinting a network element’s proto
col stack requires qualified individuals with a decent amount of
resources. The effect of a successful attack is knowledge about
potential vulnerabilities of the system, but the impact of this is
minimal, as long as this knowledge is not used to prepare an
active attack.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 1 (minimal)
83.2. Threats to integrity
T23 Manipulation of data stored by network entities: Assuming
oper mutual authentication of MNs ð-R2Þ the attacker would
ve to find a vulnerability in the implementation of the network
ack or the limited services running on the network entities,
hich requires a relatively high level of expertise. A successful
tack that allows manipulating the charging and accounting
cords is likely to receive good coverage in the general media if
alized.
Likelihood: 3 (medium), Impact: 5 (very high)
3.3. Threats to authenticity
T24 Masquerading as network entity: Assuming proper mutual
thentication of MNs ð-R2Þ the likelihood of successfully
asquerading as network entity, for example to hijack network
anagement connections, is negligible. However, a successful
tack would give the attacker control of the network and would
ely result in negative press coverage in IT/telecom media if
alized.
Likelihood: 1 (negligible), Impact: 4 (high)
3.4. Threats to availability
T25 Physical intervention: A physical destruction of (parts of)
twork entities requires very little sophistication and is there
re almost certain to occur deliberately or accidentally. The
pact of this attack is moderate, potentially affecting those
ighbors that forward traffic via this AP. This assumes the
twork entity is not a single point of failure affecting the
ailability of the whole network ð-R8Þ.
Likelihood: 5 (almost certain), Impact: 3 (medium)
T26 Resource exhaustion by an outside attacker: Exhausting the
sources of an AP from the outside requires a very skilled and
sourceful individual or group. If the attack succeeds, the impact
moderate, affecting the availability of the attacked AP and
tentially of those neighbors that forward traffic via this AP. This
sumes the network entity is not a single point of failure
fecting the availability of the whole network ð-R8Þ.
Likelihood: 4 (high), Impact: 3 (medium)
T27 Resource exhaustion by an inside attacker: Exhausting the
sources of an AP from the inside requires a very skilled and
sourceful individual or group with the capability of obtaining
thorized network access by multiple attackers and has a high
sk of exposure. If the attack succeeds, the impact is moderate,
fecting the availability of the attacked AP and potentially of
ose neighbors that forward traffic via this AP. This assumes the
twork entity is not a single point of failure affecting the
ailability of the whole network ð-R8Þ.
Likelihood: 3 (medium), Impact: 3 (medium)
T28 Resource exhaustion by Byzantine failure: While faults are
ely to exist in user terminals, it is unlikely that they cause
source exhaustion in a properly implemented network entity. If
e attack succeeds, the impact is moderate, affecting the
ailability of the attacked AP and potentially of those neighbors
at forward traffic via this AP. This assumes the network entity is
t a single point of failure affecting the availability of the whole
twork ð-R8Þ.
Likelihood: 2 (unlikely), Impact: 3 (medium)
3.5. Threats to user privacy
T29 Browsing of user related data stored by network entities:
suming proper mutual authentication of MNs ð-R2Þ the
tacker would have to find a vulnerability in the implementation
the network stack or the limited services running on the
twork entities to gain access, which requires a relatively high
vel of expertise. The impact of this attack would be relatively
F.A. Zdarsky et al. / Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34 (2011) 432–442440small as users are typically little concerned with location privacy
and expect public authorities to be able to obtain this information
from the operators anyway.
Likelihood: 3 (medium), Impact: 2 (small)
5.4. Summary
The results of the risk assessment are summarized and ranked in
Table 3. The first five entries are major risks to a WMB architecture.
Interestingly, only one (the highest ranking) of the major risks
involves an attack on wireless mesh links or the information they
transport: causing network instabilities through intelligent jamming
of multiple wireless links. Another major risk is a physical attack on
network entities which requires physical countermeasures. The last
group of attacks involves exploiting faults in the implementation of
network entities (T12 and T23) or design flaws that make network
entities open to denial of service attacks (T26).
5.5. Derived requirements
From the previous analysis, we shortly summarize the
following derived minimum security requirements:
R1 All management and control traffic MUST be robustly
encrypted when sent over a wireless link. This also applies to all
Table 3
Exposure factors and rankings of identified potential security risks.
Threat Description
T7 Intelligent jamming to cause instabilities
T23 Manipulation of data on network entities
T25 Physical destruction of network entities
T21 Unauthorized data access in network entities
T26 AP resource exhaustion by outside attacker
T9 Authentication/association flooding
T27 AP resource exhaustion by inside attacker
T4 Active management traffic analysis
T16 Active user traffic analysis
T18 Selective jamming to degrade user service
T10 Flooding of call setup/release requests
T15 Passive traffic analysis for BI
T19 Resource exhaustion by user data flooding
T28 Resource exhaustion by Byzantine failure
T29 Browsing of user-related data
T5 Manipulation of mesh management frames
T6 Masquerading as another network entity
T8 Injecting malicious protocol messages
T13 Eavesdropping user data frames
T14 Masquerading as a MN to intercept data
T17 Manipulation of user data frames
T1 Eavesdropping management frames
T2 Masquerading to intercept mgmt. frames
T3 Passive traffic analysis to find vulnerabilities
T11 Byzantine failures causing signaling flood
T12 Traffic analysis of signaling for user tracking
T20 Traffic analysis of data for user tracking
T22 Fingerprinting of network entities
T24 Masquerading to hijack management connections
I Impact, O Likelihood.
9data sent to merely ‘probe’ the existence or quality of a wireless
link.
R2 All MNs MUST be mutually authenticated before
exchanging any other management or control data.
R3 All received management and control messages MUST be
checked for authenticity, integrity and validity before any further
processing takes place.
R4 All user traffic transported in internal mesh flows MUST be
robustly encrypted when sent over a wireless link.
R5 All user traffic frames forwarded between two MNs MUST
be checked for authenticity (of the previous hop) and integrity.
R6 The acceptance and processing of user requests, such as
authentication and association or call set up requests, MUST be
rate controlled and the network entities MUST be properly
dimensioned with respect to their memory, CPU and energy
resources.
R7 All user traffic MUST be policed at the ingress point.
R8 Single points of failure MUST be avoided. All functions
MUST be able to tolerate failures of single MNs or links.
R9 All mechanisms and protocols MUST be robust to losses and
late delivery of protocol messages.
R10 The system MUST NOT keep state for unauthenticated
individuals or systems and it MUST NOT keep state for any
request that failed in order to reduce the chance of a resource
exhaustion attack.I O I  O Rank
4 4 16 1
5 3 15 2
3 5 15
4 3 12 4
3 4 12
2 5 10 6
3 3 9 7
2 4 8 8
2 4 8
2 4 8
2 3 6 11
3 2 6
3 2 6
3 2 6
2 3 6
5 1 5 16
5 1 5
5 1 5
5 1 5
5 1 5
5 1 5
4 1 4 22
4 1 4
1 4 4
2 2 4
2 2 4
2 2 4
1 4 4
4 1 4
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06. Recommendations for the architectural design
For some of the security requirements identified in Section 5.5,
namely R1 R5, standard security solutions exist that can be
employed to fulfill these requirements. For requirements R6 R10,
in contrast, no standard security solutions exist. These need to be
dealt with by ‘‘security by design’’, which means to design both
architecture and implementation in a way that precludes the
respective threats from the beginning. This section provides some
general recommendations on how to achieve these goals.
6.1. Avoid state without authorization
One type of DoS attacks is based on resource exhaustion. The
most important resources of a network entity are its memory
space, its processing power and its energy supply (if battery
powered). For the communication between nodes, bandwidth is
an important resource as well. To mount a resource exhaustion
attack, an attacker tries to identify a system’s bottleneck resource
and then attempts to occupy all of this resource, so that none or
only an insufficient share of this resource remains for legitimate
users.
A typical example is storing per user information upon a
request by an unauthenticated user. An attacker will then try to
flood the system with this type of request, changing its identity
for each request, until the buffer space for this type of request is
depleted. The same issue can also occur for authenticated users,
though, if, for example, the vulnerable system stores state for each
call set up request and the number of requests per user is not
limited.
6.2. Control signaling rates
Memory is just one of the resources to be protected from
exhaustion. Attacks on CPU and communication bandwidth try to
submit requests to the system at a higher rate than the system
can process them. Merely increasing the power of the system so
that it can process requests more quickly is both costly and
typically futile, resulting in an arms race with the attacker.
The solution is to control the rate of requests at the ingress into
the system. This can be a natural rate control, e.g. when the
bandwidth of the access link limits the number of messages that
can be sent on it per second. Otherwise the rate of requests needs
to be artificially throttled below the rate at which the system can
service requests. This also limits the amount of bandwidth
consumed for signaling, as many requests will involve sending
signaling traffic across the mesh between the access points and
the gateways.
6.3. React moderately to link degradation
In another one of the studied attack scenarios, an attacker
attempts to leverage resilience features of a WMB architecture to
make a DoS attack based on physically jamming radio links more
efficient. Assume the attacker just jams a wireless mesh link long
enough to cause the internal mesh functions to detect a link QoS
degradation and perform a link adaptation, a re routing of user
flows or even a change in the logical topology of the network.
Afterwards, the attacker does the same at a second location in the
network to which most of the traffic was shifted. The attacker
may then succeed to keep the network in an unstable state while
investing very little resources compared to jamming a large
number of links concurrently.
Although this type of attack is not possible to completely
avoid, it can be made more difficult. This requires that the
1nctions dealing with adaptation to interference make the
inimum necessary adaptations that interfere with traffic and
twork topology as little as possible. Furthermore, it is useful to
ploy a hysteresis to reduce the susceptibility to a ‘‘ping pong
fect’’.
4. Avoid single points of failure
If the goal of an attack is to violate the availability of the mesh
twork, an attack vector with high likelihood of success is a
ysical attack on mesh network entities. This requires
ercoming the physical countermeasures and then either
stroying the network entity or its communication interfaces
simply interrupting its power supply.
The effectiveness of such an attack depends on whether the
rgeted network entity is a single point of failure or not. In the
orst case, the attacked network entity is crucial for the operation
a large part or even the whole mesh network. As an example,
nsider the case of a mesh network design with a single gateway
d the call setup function in the core network or a network
sign with multiple gateways, but only one of them hosting a
ntralized routing function.
Note that to solve the vulnerability described in the last
ample it is not sufficient to introduce multiple gateways, each
e having its own centralized routing function and each one
ing responsible for a given part of the mesh network, as this
ould limit the problem to a smaller area, but not solve the
oblem. Instead, the function has to be designed for real
dundancy, i.e. any GW has to be able to take over the role of
least its neighboring GWs, should that become necessary.
5. Expect failures
Even in a design that avoids single points of failure it is good to
esign for failures’’. Failures are not only a result of a deliberate
tack, but also happen due to faulty software, overheating, etc. A
bust design therefore treats failures of mesh points, antennas,
ireless links, etc. as something that cannot be avoided, but
hich on the contrary is expected to occur. Thus, the design
ould be such that mesh points can be rebooted quickly and
inserted into the mesh topology by recovering the necessary
ate from neighboring mesh points or from a central repository.
ConclusionsThe objective of this security analysis has been to identify
tential security threats to a WMB architecture and to provide
commendations on how to resolve the underlying security
sues for the cases that standard security solutions do not exist.
e analysis started with delimiting the scope of the system
der study. The context of carrier grade WMBs helped to focus
e scope, because it makes it reasonable to assume that several
curity features are already in place and that furthermore MNs
e controlled by the operator. The following systematic analysis
en identified 29 potential security threats, out of which five
ere classified as major risks following a risk assessment. These
ajor risks are:
Intelligent jamming to cause routing and self configuration
functions to make frequent changes to the routing of trafficunstable network.
ysical destruction of network entities or interruption of the
wer supply.
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 Unauthorized access to data on network entities.
 Exhaustion of a network entity’s resources by an outside
F.A. Zdarsky et al. / Journal of Network a442attacker.An interesting observation of the risk assessment is that only
one (the highest ranking) of the major risks involves an attack on
wireless mesh links or the information they transport. The
remaining ones target potential vulnerabilities of the network
entities and require physical countermeasures as well as good
architecture and implementation design practices (security by
design). The identification of potential security threats further led
to the definition of several security requirements. A part of these
curity requirements can be met by employing standard security
lutions like Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) for end to end
essage authentication, integrity and encryption. The other
rt has to be met by ‘‘security by design’’ and several
commendations have been given to reduce the risk of
lnerabilities in the architecture design.
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